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Heinrich’s (1931) classical study implies that most industrial
accidents can be characterized as a probabilistic result of human
error.ThepresentresearchquantifiesHeinrich’sobservationand
compares four descriptive models of decision making in the ab-
stracted setting. The suggested quantification utilizes signal de-
tection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). It shows that Heinrich’s
observation can be described as a probabilistic signal detection
task. In a controlled experiment, 90 decision makers participated
in600trialsofsixsafetygames.Eachsafetygamewasanumerical
example of the probabilistic SDT abstraction of Heinrich’s propo-
sition. Three games were designed under a frame of gain to repre-
sent perception of safe choice as costless, while the other three
were designed under a frame of loss to represent perception of
safe choice as costly. Probabilistic penalty for Miss was given at
three different levels (1, .5, .1). The results showed that decisions
tended initiallyto be risky andthat experience led tosafer behav-
ior. As the probability of being penalized was lowered decisions
became riskier and the learning process was impaired. The re-
sults support the cutoff reinforcement learning model suggested
by Erev et al. (1995). The hill-climbing learning model (Busem-
eyer & Myung, 1992) was partially supported. Theoretical and
practical implications are discussed. q 1998 Academic Press
In his classical study, Heinrich (1931) noted that most industrial accidents
occur as a result of an unfortunate conjunction of a human error and a chance
event. In Heinrich’s sample of 5000 documented industrial accidents the likeli-
hood ratio of an accident, given a human error (i.e., failure to detect an unsafe
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state) was about 1:300. More recent studies (cf. Starbuch & Milliken, 1988;
Petersen, 1988; Reason, 1995) reinforce Heinrich’s argument. It seems that
accidents are affected by a combination of environment (safe or unsafe) and
thechoicebetweenasaferesponse(preventinganaccident)andariskyresponse
(possibly resulting in an accident). For example, consider an operator in a
chemical plant, who controls a heating process of certain chemicals. If the
chemical container appears to be overfilled, the operator can take a safe (yet
costly) action and empty it or a risky action and start the heating process.
Starting the heating process when the container is overfilled may result in an
explosion. Yet, Heinrich’s observation states that in most cases a failure to
detect an overfilled container does not lead to an accident (this example repre-
sents an actual problem that was studied recently by Gopher & Barzilai, 1993).
Much of the safety research that followed Heinrich’s observation focused on
the organizational rather than the individual level of decision making and the
acquisition of risky habits. To describe the organizational level, Heinrich (1931)
proposed the Domino model; i.e., an accident is an end result of a chain of
decision fallacies. The Domino model offered useful insights regarding the
conflict between safety and productivity, the relation of accidents to general
policies and day-to-day management fallacies, and the interdependency of indi-
vidual–organization–technology (see Reason, 1995; Petersen, 1988; McKenna,
1988). Neither recent versions of the Domino model (Reason, 1995; Petersen,
1988) nor motivational approaches to risk-seeking and risk-avoidance (Wilde,
1988; Summala, 1988) can be used to derive quantitative predictions. Faced
with these limitations Moray (1990) made an explicit “plea for the use of
quantitative models...o ft h ehuman cognitive system” (p. 1212).
The present paper builds upon knowledge that has been accumulated in
behavioral decision making research, in an attempt to address Moray’s sugges-
tion. It proceeds as follows: Section 1 presents a quantification of Heinrich’s
basic observation. It shows that the choice between safe and risky actions can
be modeled as a probabilistic signal detection task (Green & Swets, 1966). We
present six numerical examples (i.e., payoff conditions) of this model. Section
2 reviews four behavioral models providing a quantitative prediction of behav-
ior for the numerical examples (payoff conditions) under investigation. Two of
the four models we consider provide static predictions for choice behavior,
reflected in a single cutoff. The first is the ideal observer model implied by
traditional signal detection theory (SDT) under the assumption of expected
utility maximization. The second model is an adaptation of prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) reflecting systematic bias from the maximization
rule, which is referred to here as the PT observer. In most natural settings,
adequacy of decisions is learned from experience. The two other models we
consider provide dynamic predictions, reflected in adaptive changes of cutoff
selection. These include Busemeyer and Myung’s (1992) hill-climbing (HC)
learning model and Erev, Gopher, Itkin, and Greenshpan’s (1995) cutoff rein-
forcement learning (CRL) model. Whereas all four basic models have been
supported by previous research, their application to the current context yields
conflicting predictions. An experiment designed to compare the four models is120 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
presented in Section 3, and theoretical and practical implications are discussed
in Section 4.
1. A QUANTIFICATION OF HEINRICH’S BASIC SAFETY PROBLEM
Analysis of 5000 industrial accidents led Heinrich (1931) to propose three
elements that define the basic safety problem. The first element is the initial
environment which consists of two general states—a safe or an unsafe state.
The second element is the decision space that involves choice between safe and
risky acts. The individual is assumed to diagnose the state of the environment
as safe or unsafe and to choose a safe or a risky act. Human error (failure to
detect an unsafe state) can lead to an accident. Heinrich’s analysis indicated,
however, that most human errors do not result in any harm or loss. Given
human error, an accident occurred once in 300 pairings of unsafe conditions
and risky acts. Hence, the third element proposed by Heinrich (1931) was the
probabilistic nature of an accident given human error.
We suggest that the basic safety problem as Heinrich put it can be modeled as
a signal detection task with the unique characteristic of having a probabilistic
penalty. Heinrich’s first two elements (i.e., two states of the environment and
two possible choices) are summarized by the traditional SDT’s payoff matrix.
In safety problems the two states (Signal and Noise in SDT) are referred to
as unsafe and safe conditions, and the two responses (“Signal” and “Noise” in
SDT) are referred to as safe and risky acts. The third proposition made by
Heinrich is not modeled by traditional SDT, but can be added to the model.
This element implies that the Miss outcome (the conjunction of an unsafe state
and a risky act) is a gamble. The frequent outcome of that gamble is a near
accident (i.e., Miss error did not result with any damage), the less frequent
outcome of that gamble is an accident. In Heinrich’s study this gamble had an
accident as a defined outcome in 1 out of 300 cases. Table 1 presents a variant
of the SDT payoff matrix representing Heinrich’s principles. Note that the
traditional Miss cell is replaced with a three-parameters gamble: P, probability
of accident given Miss; Near, the outcome of a “near accident”; Accident, con-
junction of Miss and “bad luck” leading to accident.
SDT implies that the information available to the decision maker in a binary
decision task with two possible states of nature (as in Table 1) can be repre-
sented by a unidimensional signal that is sampled from one of two distributions
TABLE 1
Notations for Probabilistic Penalty Signal Detection
State of environment
Decision Unsafe (Signal) Safe (Noise)
Safe act (“Signal”) Hit False alarm
Risky act (“Noise”) Correct rejection H
(Accident, P)
(Near accident, 1 2 P)JACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 121
(statesofnature).Infact,evenwhentheenvironmentalstimuliaremultidimen-
sional they are assumed to be reducible to a single dimension that represents
the relative likelihood of the two states of nature. Figure 1 presents an example
in which the two distributions are assumed to be normal with equal variance.
The distance between the means of the two distributions (in standard deviation
units), referred to as d8, is a measure of the observer’s sensitivity.
1.1. Numerical Examples (i.e., Payoff Conditions)
Six numerical examples of the current quantification of Heinrich’s safety
problems are examined in this paper. In addition to the three characteristics
described above, the selected examples satisfy the following constraints (that
are likely to hold in real life safety situations): (1) a safe act is costly (at
least in a relative way). For example, choosing to drive slowly or to hold back
production has some cost in terms of time or money. (2) The risky act can result
in heavy loss (in the case of an accident) or in some gain (if an accident does
not occur). (3) These characteristics imply that the value of Hit (i.e., a safe act
in an unsafe environment) is lower than the value of CR (a risky act in a safe
environment), and that the cost of FA (an unnecessary safe act when the
environment is safe) is lower than the cost of Accident (as a subresult of Miss).
(4) An important property of safety is that the absence of an accident is a
deficient feedback for the choice of a safe act since it does not reveal the state
oftheenvironment;i.e.,onecanneverbesureifthesafeactwasreallynecessary
(Reason,1995).Reason’spointimpliesthatHitandFAoutcomesshareidentical
values. (5) In the same manner one can argue that the absence of an accident
has the same deficient effect when an unsafe act has been taken and that CR
FIG. 1. The Signal and Noise distributions in signal detection theory. The distance between
the means of the two distributions (d8) is the sensitivity. The cutoff point above which the decision
maker indicates that this is a signal specifies the response criterion b.122 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
and Near (the second subresult of Miss) outcomes will also have identical
values.
Thus,therankorderofthepossibleoutcomesshowninTable1issummarized
as follows:
v(Accident) , (v(Hit) 5 v(FA) ) , (v(CR) 5 v(Near).
Six payoff matrices in line with this ordering are presented in Table 2.
Whereas these payoff matrices can be used to represent many types of safety
problems, it is convenient to consider a specific “cover story.” Returning to the
chemical plant example, assume that an operator observes a signal indicating
that the chemical container may be overfilled and has to decide whether to
empty it or ignore the risk and start the heating process. The payoff matrix
in Table 2a represents a hypothetical decision maker who perceives the safe
act (emptying the container) as costless; i.e. for this decision maker taking the
safe action causes no loss or gain independent of the state of nature. A risky
act (starting the heating process) yields a small gain (if the state is safe) or a
costly accident (if the state is unsafe). (Note that in this example the gamble
has only one outcome with the probability P 5 1.)
TABLE 2
Six Payoff Conditions Representing Heinrich’s Safety Problem
ab
State of environment State of environment
Decision Unsafe Safe Decision Unsafe Safe
Safe act 0 0 Safe act 21 21
Risky act 1 Risky act 0 H
(210, 1)
(1, 0) JH
(211, 1)
(0, 0) J
cd
State of environment State of environment
Decision Unsafe Safe Decision Unsafe Safe
Safe act 0 0 Safe act 21 21
Risky act 1 Risky act 0 H
(221, .5)
(1, .5) JH
(222, .5)
(0, .5) J
ef
State of environment State of environment
Decision Unsafe Safe Decision Unsafe Safe
Safe act 0 0 Safe act 21 21
Risky act 1 Risky act 0
H
(2109, .1)
(1, .9) JH
(2110, .1)
(0, .9) JACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 123
While the payoff matrix in Table 2a allows for gain (referred hereafter as a
frame of gain), no such gain is possible in Table 2b (referred hereafter as a
frame of loss). This payoff matrix represents a second hypothetical decision
maker that, unlike the first, perceives the safe act as costly (in absolute terms;
for example, loss of time). When this decision maker diagnoses a safe state
correctly (CR) he or she neither wins nor loses since it is his/her custom to
start the heating process without a second thought. If he or she takes a risky
actgiven anunsafeenvironment (i.e.,Miss), anaccidentoccurs withprobability
1. Note that Table 2b was created by a subtraction of a constant (1 unit) from
each cell in Table 2a. This was done to ensure an identical expected value
maximization strategy under the two payoff matrices. We will utilize this point
in the following sections.
The first two examples follow traditional SDT (the gamble was reduced to
a deterministic outcome since P equaled 1). The remaining four payoff matrices
relax this assumption and allow for a probabilistic penalty for Miss errors.
Two of them are directly derived from the payoff matrix in Table 2a (a frame
of gain), and the other two are derived from the payoff matrix in Table 2b (a
frame of loss). The only change is in the Miss (gamble) cell (the value of the
penalty is higher while the probability for that penalty is lower, keeping the
expected value of Miss constant). In these four payoff matrices, an error of the
decision maker can go unpunished. In Heinrich’s terms, failure to detect an
unsafe state (or a conjunction between an unsafe state and a risky act) does
not always result in an accident. In the payoff matrices presented in Tables
2c and 2d the probability for penalty under Miss is P 5 .5; i.e., only half of the
Miss errors lead to an accident. In the payoff matrices presented in Tables 2e
and 2f the probability for penalty under Miss is P 5 .1; i.e., only one tenth of
Miss errors lead to an accident. The six numerical examples can be summarized
into a factorial design of frame 3 probabilistic penalty. Three examples repre-
sent aframe ofgain (i.e.,the safeact iscostless), whilethe otherthree represent
a frame of loss (i.e., the safe act is costly). For each frame there are three
different levels of probabilistic penalty for Miss (P 5 1, .5, or .1).
2. BEHAVIORAL MODELS
Human behavior in these cases can be predicted by several quantitative
decision-making models. Four alternative models representing four different
approaches to risk taking will be considered here. To facilitate derivation of
the predictions of all the models we consider for the six examples described
above, we add two additional numerical assumptions: d8 5 1.5 and the prior
probability p(Unsafe state) 5.3. These assumptions were utilized in the experi-
ment described below.
SDT Ideal Observer Model
Since we are dealing with a signal detection task, the SDT’s ideal observer
model is a natural choice for predicting behavior. According to traditional124 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
SDT an observer is assumed to use a cutoff decision rule, meaning that a
unidimensional stimulus will be labeled “Signal” if its intensity equals or ex-
ceeds the cutoff point (referred to as b) and otherwise labeled as “Noise” (see
Fig. 1). In order to maximize expected outcome the observer has to set an
optimal cutoff (referrer to as b*). Under the assumption of risk neutrality,
calculation of the optimal strategy is not affected by the probabilistic nature
of the Miss outcome. Rather, only the expected values of the different outcomes
are important. The optimal cutoff is sensitive both to the four outcome values
and to the prior probabilities of Signal and Noise (P(S), P(N)). Application of
this logic to the current task implies that the probabilistic Miss outcome can
be replaced by its expected value. Thus, the optimal cutoff is given by:
b* 5 P (x|S)/P (x|N) 5 (CR 2 FA)/(Hit 2 EV(Miss)) * (P(N)/P(S)).
The ideal observer model predicts that an observer will act as if he or she
computes the optimal cutoff b*. All six numerical examples (payoff conditions)
were designed to have identical risk neutral (RN) optimal cutoffs (b* 5 0.233,
ln b* 52 1.457). The prediction of the SDT ideal (RN) observer is therefore
that behavior, reflected in cutoff placement, should be optimal and identical
for all six conditions. According to this model, behavior would not be affected
by probabilistic penalty nor by the different frames (gain or loss). In addition,
under the ideal observer model the estimated diagnostic sensitivity (d8)i s
independent of the payoff matrix. It is determined by the distance (in standard
deviation units) between the means of the two distributions (see Fig. 1), and
should be 1.5 in the current examples.
Note, however, that calculation of the ideal observer’s predictions utilizes
information concerning the payoff matrix and prior probabilities. It is unlikely
that in industrial settings of the type studied by Heinrich this information is
explicitly available, and it will not be provided in the experiment described
below, so that the ideal observer does not have a clear prediction for the current
setting. However, the prediction can be adjusted to the current setting under
the assumption that the observer will learn the necessary parameters from the
availablefeedback andwillarrive attheoptimalprediction throughexperience.
An Adaptation of Prospect Theory—the PT Observer Model
It can be demonstrated that the ideal observer model is a corollary of the
expected value (EV) rule (see Sperling & Dosher, 1986). Thus, observations
that expected utility theory is often violated (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
suggest that the model has to be modified in order to describe choice behavior.
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) the current model assumes that the
observer tries to maximize the S value function assumed by prospect theory
(i.e., concave for gain, convex and steeper for loss). In this model, referred to
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in the gain domain and by risk seeking in the loss domain.1 Recall that b*i s
calculated under the assumption of risk neutrality. In the PT observer model,
b is expected to fall below b* (i.e., below .233) for gain, and above .233 for loss.
A weaker prediction of this model is that the observer’s cutoff will be relatively
lower for gain as compared to a higher cutoff for loss.
Hill-Climbing Model
The hill-climbing model was developed by Busemeyer and Myung (1992) to
describe learning processes in SDT tasks.2 According to the HC model an
observer performing a signal detection task modifies performance by a step-
to-step shifting of the cutoff. For each step of n trials, the HC observer uses a
specific cutoff. To determine the cutoff for the next step the observer compares
the average payoffs of the two previous steps. Shifting will be made in the
direction of the cutoff which resulted in the higher average payoff. For example,
if each step constitutes one trial, (n 5 1), the HC observer is assumed to reflect
upon the two preceding trials when facing trial t. If the last cutoff shift from
t 22t ot 21 resulted in a larger payoff, the cutoff will shift on trial t in the
same direction. If the last shift resulted in a lower payoff, the next cutoff will
shift in the opposite direction. If the last cutoff shift made no difference, the
HC observer will choose the next shift at random, as if to check again his
position. The model has a “shift size” (adjustment) parameter that implies a
finite number of cutoffs. Busemeyer and Myung’s quantification is presented
in Appendix A. The HC model can be considered as a variant of directional
learning (Selten, 1996) where step size n determines the pace of learning. An
elegant experimental design (Busemeyer & Myung, 1992) showed hill-climbing
predictions to be superior to such classical models as the ideal observer and
common error correction models (reviewed by Kubovy & Healy, 1977).
For the payoff conditions suggested above, the HC model predictions are
sensitive to the model’s step size (the free parameter n). Given a relatively
small step size, it predicts risky behavior. There are two reasons for this predic-
tion. First, the majority of the stimuli belong to the Noise category, so the
“Noise” response in these cases results in higher values (CR) than the “Signal”
response (FA). Second, when the stimulus belongs to the Signal category there
is still a chance that the “Noise” response will go unpunished (a near accident
may even result in a positive value). Given larger step sizes the HC model
predicts less risky choices since average payoffs of larger steps serve as better
estimates of the EV for a specific cutoff. With better estimates (i.e., very large
1This adaptation of prospect theory is only partial. It is focused on the value function suggested
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), yet it does not take into account the decision weights which
are another important component of the theory.
2The hill-climbing model is a submodel developed by Busemeyer and Myung (1992) as part of
a larger model of decision rule learning which is composed of two parts: an adaptive network
model that determines the decision rule for a given situation, followed by the hill-climbing process
for fine tuning the chosen rule’s parameters. We concentrated on the hill-climbing model because
the decision rule used for SDT tasks is a cutoff rule.126 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
step sizes) this model converges to the ideal observer prediction. Probabilistic
penalty causes further damage to these estimates resulting in the prediction
of riskier cutoffs (i.e., higher) as the probability for penalty decreases. Finally,
the HC model predicts no framing effect since it is more sensitive to the ranking
order than to the exact quantity of outcomes.
To derive the hill-climbing model predictions of the estimated cutoff place-
ment (b) and diagnostic sensitivity (d8) for the six payoff conditions, we ran
two sets of computer simulations, using the original parameters of Busemeyer
and Myung, with a small step size (n 5 1) for one set and a large step size
(n 5 10) for the other set. The remaining parameters were: the most extreme
cutoff Cmin 52 5 (in standardized units) and number of cutoffs M 5 41, the
magnitude of change 5 .25, the probability of an increase (and a decrease)
given identical payoff in the last two trials 5 .5 (see Busemeyer & Myung,
1992, for raw parameters and additional details). Specific predictions for ln b
and for d8 are presented in the third column of Figs. 4 and 5 and are dis-
cussed later.
Cutoff Reinforcement Learning Model
The last model is the cutoff reinforcement learning model proposed by Erev,
Gopher, Itkin, and Greenshpan (1995). The CRL model assumes that the ob-
server’s choices among possible cutoffs can be described by the law of effect
(Thorndike, 1898) as quantified by Roth and Erev (1995). This states that the
probability of adopting a certain strategy (i.e., a cutoff) increases if this strategy
is positively reinforced and decreases if it results in negative outcome. Ac-
cording to the CRL model, each observer has an initial propensity to choose
eachofafinal setofcutoffs.Theprobabilityofselecting cutoffcisdeterminedby
the ratio of its specific propensity and the sum of all other existing propensities.
Positive reinforcement increases the propensity of the selected cutoff, while
negative payoff reduces it. Erev et al.’s (1995) quantification is presented in
Appendix B. Unlike the HC model, which comprises a systematic search for
the best cutoff, the CRL model allows for random experimentation with differ-
ent cutoffs over a wide range. This may slow the learning rate, but it may also
help to avoid local maximum or suboptimal cutoffs. Erev (1998) demonstrated
that the CRL model can account for robust violations of the ideal observer
model. Among the 19 violations considered by Erev (1998) are conservatism
and probability matching. He also presented a comparison between the CRL
and the HC models, showing that in the tasks studied by Busemeyer and
Myung (1992) the two models have similar descriptive values.
TheCRLmodelwasrecentlyshowntoaccountforbehaviorinsafety-likeSDT
tasks.Gopher,Itkin,Erev,Meyer,andArmoni (1995)showedthatpredictionsof
the CRL model held for both implicit and explicit cutoff paradigms and for
one-persontasks andtwo-personshared responsibilitytasks.The payoffmatrix
used in these studies was identical to the one shown in Table 2a. The prediction
of CRL for this payoff matrix (in a one-person signal detection task) included
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the short run) followed by a consistent trend to lower cutoffs toward the optimal
one. Yet, the CRL model was not applied to probabilistic signal detection tasks
as in the present work. The meaning of probabilistic penalty in the CRL model’s
terms is that risky cutoffs might be reinforced even when they lead to a Miss.
Reinforcement of risky strategies will increase as the probability for penalty
decreases.
To derive the predictions of the CRL model for the six payoff conditions,
computer simulations were run using the original parameters of Erev et al.
(1995). These include two strategy space parameters (the most extreme cutoff
Cmin 52 5 and number of cutoffs M 5 101)3; two initial propensity parameters
(initial standard deviation si 5 1.5, and initial strength s(1) 5 3x (the average
payoff from random choice)); three reference point parameters (an initial refer-
ence point r(1) 5 0 and weights for positive and negative outcome w+ 5 .01,
w2 5 .02); a generalization standard deviation sg 5 .025; a recency parameter
w 5 .001; and a technical parameter to ensure that all propensities are positive
(v 5 .0001). The model predictions for ln b and for d8 are presented in the
fourth column of Figs. 4 and 5, and are discussed in the Results section below.
In summary, inspection of Figs. 4 and 5 reveals that each of the four models
yieldsdifferentpredictionsfortheexamplesofHeinrich’ssafetyproblemconsid-
ered here. The ideal observer predicts convergence to optimal and identical
behavior for all six conditions. The PT observer model predicts a framing effect:
risk aversion for gain matrices (Tables 2a, 2c, 2e) and risk seeking for loss
matrices (Tables 2b, 2d, 2f). The HC model predicts stable risky behavior. This
prediction is more extreme for the small step size and moderate for the large
step size. Finally, the CRL model predicts a pattern of initial tendency toward
risky behavior, followed by a gradual shift to safer behavior. Both the HC and
CRL models predict that behavior will become riskier as the probability for
penalty is lowered. A signal detection experiment, designed to compare the
four alternative sets of predictions, is presented in the next section.
3. EXPERIMENT
In order to compare the four models, the experiment examined choice behav-
ior under the six numerical examples (payoff conditions) for which the models’
predictions were derived. The choice of the six conditions implies that, in
addition to model comparisons, the experiment will shed light on some “model
free”questions,i.e.,theeffectsofprobabilisticpenalty,andgainandlossframes,
in probabilistic signal detection tasks. The experimental task was adapted
from Lee (1963), displaying different heights arising from either of two experi-
3Using the original parameters of CRL and HC models resulted in an unequal number of cutoffs.
While the CRL model defines explicitly the set of 101 cutoffs, the HC model’s set of cutoffs is
determined by the magnitude of change in every shift. We used the original magnitude of change
(in std units) which defined 41 cutoffs. Using more cutoffs for the HC model would have caused
it to predict slower learning.128 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
mentally determined normal distributions. Administrated d8 (the distance be-
tween the means of the two distributions) was 1.5 standard deviation units.
Signal (an unsafe state) was represented by the higher distribution with
p(S) 5 .3 while Noise (a safe state) was represented by the lower distribution
andwasgivenwiththecomplementaryp(N)5.7(seeFig.2forillustration).The
six payoff conditions imply a 2 3 3 factorial design of frame-type 3 probabilistic
penalty. Three statistical indices of interest were Miss rates, the representative
of potential accidents; b, the measure of cutoff placement which represents the
strategic tendency toward safe or risky behavior; and d8, the measure of the
diagnostic sensitivity of subjects.
3.1. Method
Participants. Ninety Technion students participated in the experiment.
They were recruited by advertisements offering monetary reward of 20–35
NIS ($6.67–$11.67) according to their performance during a 1-h computerized
experiment. Average payoff was 25 NIS ($8.33).
Apparatus. The experiment was programmed using Visual Basic 3 for Win-
dows on a 486PC with a Super VGA 149 screen. Figure 2 presents the stimuli
shown on the screen and illustrates the underlying distributions which were
not shown to participants. A green rectangle 14 cm high and 7.5 cm wide was
placed in the center of a 19 3 26 cm blue background. Two feedback fields
FIG. 2. A schematic depiction of the experimental task. The stimulus with underlying distribu-
tions. Distributions are not shown to the subjects and are only added here for demonstration
purposes. Feedback for last trial and cumulative scores is presented in the two text boxes.ACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 129
were located 1 cm above the rectangle (white text boxes of 1 3 2 cm). The right
one was labeled “score” and the left one was labeled “last trial.” A white 2 3
2 mm square at different points along the right border of the rectangle served
as stimulus and represented different heights relative to the rectangle. The
position of the square was determined by a two stage sampling—one for select-
ing High or Low distribution and the other for selecting 1 out of 66 possible
locations according to the selected normal distribution.
Each trial began with a 2-s presentation of the white square. Response was
made by pressing one of two keys on the keyboard (^3& for “low” and ^6& for
“high” on the right number panel). After the response was made, feedback was
given as to the trial score and the cumulative score (i.e., “last trial” and “score”;
see Fig. 2). The trial score was given according to the relevant payoff matrix,
with random choice between penalty or no penalty for Miss. Cumulative score
was adjusted accordingly. Feedback was presented for 3 s before beginning the
next trial.
Procedure. Participants received written instructions which were also read
aloud. They were told that they are playing a game in which they have to
decide whether a presented white square is high or low. They were given a
hint about the probabilistic nature of the square using an example taken from
Kubovy and Healy (1977) about categorizing a person as a man or a woman
according to his/her height. The experiment consisted of six blocks of 100 trials
each. At the beginning of each block participants received 2000 points. In each
trial they could earn or lose points according to their decision and according
to the payoff matrix employed (with the loss matrices participants were aware
that they should minimize losses). A block was terminated with an on screen
announcement “End of Block,” and another block started when the participant
pressed the “Enter” key. Participants were told that there were six blocks for
the game and that their goal was to win as many points as they could in every
block. Participants were not informed about the payoff matrix. Instead, they
were told that they have to learn the possible outcomes from the step-to-step
feedback. Nor did participants know the exact monetary value of each point,
but that payment would be proportional to the score and is given according to
a random choice of one of the six scores they achieve in the entire game.4
To fully understand the task, participants were given 2 min training with a
symmetric payoff matrix. This also served to monitor initial propensities and
to direct initial strategies to the natural startup point b 5 1. After training,
subjects were told that the experiment was about to begin and that points
would now be differently allotted, which they would have to learn through the
step-by-step feedback.
4Roth and Maluf (1979) noted that when the specific relation of monetary payoff to “points” is
probabilistic, the expected utility theory implies the EV rule. We did not inform subjects of the
details of the payoff rule in advance (they only knew that the probability of a bonus increases
with the number of points), as experimental results (Selten et al., 1996) suggest that this may
lead to confusion. Payment was proportional to the points with a step of minimal payment: The
initial 2000 points were equivalent to a minimal payoff of 20 NIS. Each extra point added .2 NIS.130 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
Experimental design. As noted above, the six payoff conditions resulted in
a23 3 between subjects design. Three different levels of probabilistic penalty
were used in the frame of gain and three in the frame of loss (see Tables 2a–2f).
Learning was measured within subjects through repeated measurements on
six blocks.
3.2. Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents the main experimental results by experimental condition
and block. Using the common signal detection statistics, Table 3 displays the
mean rate of Hit (p(Hit)), False-Alarm (p(FA)) and Miss (p(Miss)). Also pre-
sented are the means of the derived statistics, ln b and estimated d8 (which
represent the strategic cutoff placement and sensitivity, respectively).5 We use
the transformation from b to ln b in order to avoid the skewed distribution of b.
Model-Free Hypothesis Testing
Rate of Miss errors. Figure 3 presents the rates of Miss errors for each
experimentalconditionbyblocks.ErrorsofthistypewerethefocusofHeinrich’s
study because they can lead to accidents. Table 3 and Fig. 3 indicate that the
miss rate increases with a decrease in the probability of being penalized. A
decline in the miss rate was observed over time. A three-way ANOVA (probabi-
listic penalty 3 frame 3 block) with repeated measures on block was conducted
to evaluate the significance of these trends. The analysis reveals a significant
main effect for probabilistic penalty, indicating a consistent increase in Miss
errors as the probability for penalty decreases (F[2,84] 5 88.28 p , .0001).
The effect of learning (block) was also significant indicating that experience
created a consistent decrease in Miss errors (F[5,420] 5 26.67 p , .0001). The
framing effect was significant only at the lowest level of probabilistic penalty
(.1) where the number of errors was higher for the frame of loss than for gain
(F[1,84] 5 10.14, p 5 .002).
Response criterion ln b. The right-hand column in Figs. 4a–4c presents
graphically the results for ln b. The models’ predictions are given to the left of
the empirical data. The HC and CRL models’ predictions for each experimental
condition show the average of 1500 simulations (100 replications, each with
15 virtual subjects) summarized (like the experimental data) in six blocks of
100 rounds. Recall that higher values reflect risky cutoffs and lower values
reflect cautious cutoffs.
5SDT statistics cannot be calculated given p(Hit) and p(FA) 5 0 or 1. To avoid this problem,
zeros were replaced by .025, and ones were replaced by .975. Of the 90 (subjects) 3 6 (blocks) 5
540 assessments, replacements were needed for cases of zeros for p(Hit) 6 times, for cases of zeros
for p(FA) 34 times (29 of them in the .1 loss frame), for cases of ones for p(Hit) 15 times, and for
the cases of ones for p(FA) 2 times. Over all, there were 57 replacements.ACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 131
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FIG. 3. Miss rates (representing critical errors) across payoff conditions. The miss rate is
larger with small penalty probabilities.
A three-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of probabilistic pen-
alty (F[2,84] 5 16.32, p , .0001) maintaining increased risk taking with de-
creased probability of penalty. The main effect of learning (block) is also signifi-
cant (F[5,420] 5 22.16, p , .0001) and it indicates that experience leads to a
consistent decrease in ln b values toward the optimal point. The main effect
of the frame was not significant (F[1,84] 5 .13, ns) indicating that, in general,
subjects neither took riskier choices under the frame of loss nor behaved more
cautiously or avoided risk in the frame of gain. Even so, a short-run relative
framing effect was significant in the first block (F[1,84] 5 5.94, p , .017).
Notice that at all three levels of probabilistic penalty, the first block shows
riskier cutoff for loss compared to gain. Closer inspection indicates that the
statistical source of the short-run framing effect was the first block of the .1
probabilistic penalty, in which the cutoff for the loss matrix was markedly
riskier than the cutoff for the gain matrix (F[1,84] 5 9.87, p , .0023).
Sensitivity d8. The right-hand columns in Figs. 5a–5c present graphically
the results for d8. The three alternative predictions for d8 are presented graphi-
cally to the left of the empirical data (the HC and CRL models predictions
show the average of 1500 simulations). Analysis of variance shows a main
effect for probabilistic penalty (F[2,84] 5 15.02, p , .0001) indicating that
estimated d8 decreases with a decrease in the probability of penalty. The effect
of learning was also significant, as the values of d8 increased with practice
(F[5,420] 5 2.45, p , 0.0332). Interestingly, unlike ln b, d8 is apparently
influenced by the frame. A significant framing effect (F[1,84] 5 3.93, p , 0.05)
implying that d8 values were lower in the loss domain was observed. The loss
of sensitivity in the frame of loss is especially clear in Figs. 5a and 5b (at theACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 133
FIG. 4. Average ln b values across payoff conditions. The filled squares represent ln b for the
gain matrices, and the empty diamonds represent ln b for the loss matrices. Predictions are shown
from left to right (1) SDT ideal observer, (2) PT observer, (3) Hill-climbing model (higher values
for step size 5 1 and lower values for step size 5 10), and (4) CRL model. Experimental results
are presented in the right-hand column.
lowest level of probabilistic penalty d8 values are very low for both frames; see
Fig. 5c).
Model Comparison
Qualitative comparison for response criterion (ln b). A comparison of the
models’ predictions and the actual results is provided in Fig. 4. As can be seen,134 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
FIG. 5. Average d8 values across payoff conditions. The filled squares represent d8 for the gain
matrices, and the empty diamonds represent d8 for the loss matrices. Predictions are shown from
left to right (1) SDT ideal observer and PT observer, (2) Hill-climbing model (small and large step
sizes yield similar predictions), and (3) CRL model. Experimental results are presented in the
right-hand column.
the two static models do not provide a good approximation for behavior. In
addition to overlooking the significant learning trend, these models do not
capture the behavior of experienced players. Specifically, subjects took greater
risks than predicted by the ideal observer model and were sensitive to the
probability of penalty which was not predicted by this model. The PT observerACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 135
model captures the qualitative trends in the first block but fails to predict
learning toward the optimal cutoff.
The two dynamic models were closer to actual behavior. The HC model
predictions served as the upper and lower bounds of the experimental results.
Initial risky behavior was in agreement with the smaller step size prediction,
and closing (safer) behavior was in agreement with the larger step size predic-
tion. Both sets of the HC predictions were in agreement with the main effect
of probabilistic penalty. The CRL model also captured the effect of probabilistic
penalty. In addition this model captured the initial risk taking behavior that
represents learning away from optimal behavior. In line with the prediction
of this model, the counterproductive risk taking was larger with small penalty
probabilities. Finally, note that neither CRL nor HC models captured the short-
run framing effect.
Qualitative comparison for sensitivity d8. In line with the cutoff statistics
the dynamic models provide better predictions of sensitivity (d8 values as pre-
sented in Figs. 5a–5c). Contrary to the static models’ predictions for d8 (i.e.,
d8 5 1.5), the experimental results showed a gradual increase with time, as
well as probability and frame effects. The HC model captured the decline in
d8 values due to a probabilistic penalty, but not the increase in d8 with practice.
The effect of a probabilistic penalty on d8 was also captured by the CRL model
which, in addition, captured the effect of practice on d8 and the experimental
framing effect, i.e., higher d8 values for the gain and lower values for loss.
Note that in simulations that were run to derive the predictions of the CRL
and the HC models, the virtual subjects had true (virtual) d8 of 1.5 (i.e., the
distance between the two observed distributions was 1.5 STD units). The esti-
mated d8 values in these simulations were lower than 1.5. This was a result
of the continuous cutoff changes in the HC model and of the probabilistic choice
rule in the CRL model. The resulting inconsistency reduces the estimated d8.
Thus, the relatively good fit between the experimental d8 and the dynamic
models’ predictions suggests that the low experimental d8 might reflect
response variability rather than perceptual ability.
Quantitative model comparisons. To allow for quantitative comparison of
the two dynamic learning models we created a data set that includes the
observedresultsanddifferentpredictionsforeachofthe36experimentalblocks
(6 conditions 3 6 blocks) for each statistic (ln b and d8). Table 4 presents two
types of quantitative fitness scores derived from these data. These include the
correlations between the experimental data and model predictions, and MSD
scores (mean squared differences between model predictions and the experi-
mental data).6
Both fitness scores reveal a consistent order in which the HC model with
step size 1 has the lowest fitness scores (for both ln b and d)8, the HC model
with step size 10 has better scores, and the CRL model offers the best scores.
6 The F statistics for the MSD scores test whether the experimental data diverge significantly
from the predicted means.136 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
TABLE 4
Dynamic Learning Models’ Fitness Scores: Pearson Correlation
(r(model,experimental)), MSD Estimates, and Related F Statistics
Statistic
Fitness score Model ln b d8
Correlation HC (step 5 1) .25 .04
HC (step 5 10) .71** 2.01
CRL .83** .69**
56.95 16.19
MSD HC (step 5 1) F[4,30] 5 7.30* F[4,30] 5 3.22*
16.14 17.78
HC (step 5 10) F[4,30] 5 2.07 ns F[4,30] 5 3.54*
13.40 6.33
CRL F[4,30] 5 1.72 ns F[4,30] 5 1.26 ns
* P , .05.
** P , .01.
Positive correlations between the models’ mean predictions and the mean re-
sults for ln b were observed in all three cases, so that all sets of predictions
included the trend of response criterion shifts with practice. The correlations
for the HC model with step size 10 and the CRL model reached significance.
Only the CRL predictions were significantly correlated with the observed d8
scores. The HC model predictions (i.e., a decrease in d8 with practice) were
inconsistent with the experimental d8 values. MSD statistics agree with the
correlations pattern (see Table 4).
These results suggest that whereas both the HC and the CRL models capture
important aspects of the data, the CRL model provided better qualitative and
quantitative approximation. However, some important questions remain to be
answered. How do different search rules arrive at similar predictions? Why
does the HC model fail to capture the effect of experience on d8? Why does the
PT observer model fail to capture behavior in the current task? We address
these and other points in the next section.
4. DISCUSSION
The present research demonstrates that Heinrich’s (1931) characterization
of the sources of industrial accidents can be modeled as a probabilistic signal
detectiontask.Thisabstractionfacilitatesthederivationofquantitativepredic-
tions and the experimental examination of behavior. The experimental results,
summarized above, provide indications of six behavioral tendencies in these
tasks: (1) initial learning toward suboptimal risky behavior; (2) slow learning
towardsaferoptimalcutoffplacementoverthelongterm;(3)decreasedlearning
speed (and increased miss rate) with decreased probability of penalty; (4) slow
increase in d8 with experience; (5) d8 impaired by probabilistic penalty; and
(6) d8 impaired by the absence of positive outcomes. These results suggest thatACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 137
in the tasks under study, dynamic models provide a better approximation
of behavior than static models. In addition, the results suggest that small
quantitative details can have a robust effect on initial risk taking behavior
and on the speed of adaptation/learning process. It appears, then, that quantifi-
cation of Heinrich’s observation, and of the dynamic decision process, can lead
to interesting implications.
Theoretical Implications
The relative success of the two dynamic models suggests that their common
assumptionshaveadescriptivevalue.Theseassumptionsstatethat(1)subjects
choose (or behave as if they do) among cutoff strategies and that (2) these
choices are sensitive (in an adaptive sense) to the obtained payoff experience.
These assumptions are apparently sufficient to capture the main behavioral
trends.
The two models differ with respect to the assumed quantitative relation
between the obtained payoffs and cutoff selections. Whereas the HC model
implies qualitative directional learning, the CRL model assumes a quantitative
probabilistic response that is sensitive to accumulated reinforcements. To un-
derstand this difference, it should be noted that the HC model violates two
basic principles of the CRL model: the law of effect and the power law of
practice. The law of effect is violated by the assumption that a reinforced cutoff
will be discarded during the systematic directional search. The power law of
practiceimpliesstabilizationofbehaviorwithpractice.Thisprincipleisviolated
by the assumption that the step size (which determines the learning pace) does
not depend on the learner’s accumulated experience. Stabilization is denied
by the continuous change of the cutoff at fixed intervals and magnitude. The
significance of the power law of practice is most apparent in the case of the
observed d8. An increase in the observed d8 with practice reflects the increased
consistency of cutoff choice (Kubovy & Healy, 1977). The CRL model predicts
this effect because it gradually reduces the number of relevant cutoffs and the
magnitude of changes. The HC model fails to predict the observed d8 because
of the inconsistency inherent to its search rule.
However, this work was not designed to determine which of the four consid-
ered theoretical approaches is the “accurate” one. Rather, we compared specific
generalizations of these approaches in a specific setting. The results do not
rule out the possibility that in the long run, subjects may arrive at the ideal
observer predictions or that if the decisions were presented as numerical gam-
bles, a PT pattern would emerge. The HC model could outperform the CRL
model in an explicit cutoff paradigm (Busemeyer & Myung’s experimental
paradigm). Moreover, we have employed here only one version of the HC model
in which adjustments of cutoff are made using a constant. The general model
presents a broader assumption, stating that adjustment should be a monotone
function of the product of the change in cutoff and the change in average payoff.
For example, it is possible to suggest quantitative adjustment for the current
setting, in which the change of cutoff equals this exact product. This way, a138 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
penalty will have a significant effect on the learning process (even if given
rarely). A pilot study using computer simulations shows that with this version,
the predicted learning process is very similar to the CRL prediction. Yet, this
slight change does not solve the consistency problem. To allow the increase in
consistency, an implementation of the power law of practice is needed. For
example, one could assume that the step size increases with experience, there-
fore decreasing the rate of cutoff changes and stabilizing behavior. It is possible
that this kind of HC model variation will outperform the CRL model in the
considered tasks. The current results simply demonstrate that, in the current
setting, the CRL model provided a more useful prediction of behavior; it cor-
rectly predicted all six qualitative experimental trends and provided a good
quantitative fit. Demonstration of the success of a specific approach does not
rule out the possibility that other approaches could also be useful.
Some Limitations and Future Extensions
The implementation of both SDT and dynamic models of decision making
have some limitations. One apparent limitation of SDT as a model for safety
problems concerns the way it represents the environment. The abstraction of
the environment as a series of independent categorization tasks is of course
an oversimplification. In many industrial settings sequential tasks are corre-
lated. For example, if a system breaks on trial t it is likely to stay broken at
t 1 1 (unless it has been fixed). The first author is now extending the present
work using continuous stimuli, investigating this and related questions. An-
other oversimplification regards the complexity of the signals. Whereas the
current experiment focused on unidimensional stimuli, most natural safety
problems involve multidimensional stimuli. Under traditional SDT the addi-
tional dimensions do not create a problem since they can be reduced to a single
dimension. Yet, this assertion is not likely to hold descriptively (Busemeyer &
Myung, 1992). Future research is needed to address multidimensional stimuli.
Thecurrentimplementationofthedynamicmodelsdoesnottakeintoaccount
prior expectations that are likely to affect behavior in natural settings. For
example, think about the detection of car tracks during the selection of a spot
to place a sleeping bag. In such a case, a Miss error is more than likely to be
fatal. Obviously, most decision makers need no reinforcement learning process
to avoid the risky decision in this setting. To take this into account in the CRL
model, attention has to be paid to the decision maker’s initial propensities. In
the above scenario, the decision maker is likely to have a strong inclination
against sleeping on the car tracks, which implies that in some cases, choice
behavior is sensitive to initial tendencies. Hence, these tendencies have to be
precisely modeled. Future research should address this issue. One possible
solution could be based on the idea that PT can be used to approximate initial
propensities. This solution is supported by the observation of PT’s reflection
effect in the first block of our experiment.
Another information-related problem of the dynamic models arises in situa-
tions in which important, nonpayoff, feedback is provided during the learningACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 139
period. For example, consider a driver who succeeds in taking an icy turn
safely, but is aware of the ice. According to the CRL model, this driver’s risk-
taking tendency is positively reinforced. However, it is also possible that the
driver will consider the new information (“the road is icy”) and decide to be
more careful. This behavior can be modeled by the CRL model with the assump-
tion that the outcome of “near accident” can be negative reinforcement. Again,
this aspect requires future research.
Some Practical Implications
The present work focuses on situations in which the decision makers’ feed-
back can be approximated by their personal “final outcome” experience. We
contend that many industrial tasks, as well as daily manual and perceptual
tasks, fall into this category. Our experimental results imply that the six behav-
ioral trends observed in the experiment are likely to characterize performance
in these tasks. This suggests, for example, that during the initial learning
period, the probability of an accident might increase with practice. This can
be used when planning optimal training procedures.
Another suggestion involves the effect of positive feedback. We found that
such feedback increases consistency and reduces the miss rate. This is consis-
tent with (and provides an explanation for) field results. In a recent paper
reviewing 24 safety field studies McAfee and Winn (1989) concluded that safety
programs which provided some sort of positive feedback (feedback, verbal
prizes,tokens)elicitedthedesiredsafetybehaviors.Theresultsforprobabilistic
penalty shed some light on the effect of punishment on unsafe behaviors. The
penalty for Miss, which represented the critical error, enabled learning in our
payoff conditions. The penalty was the most informative payoff since nature
(i.e., a Signal representing danger) was only revealed to the subjects when
they were penalized. Using a penalty as feedback for unsafe behavior offers
two practical implications. First, the feedback for unsafe behavior should be
selective, i.e., punishment should not be given for all unsafe acts, but should
offer information regarding specific critical errors. Second, while a penalty may
not be excessive, it should be administered for as many errors as possible, in
order to arrive at the best learning process.
These implications return us to Heinrich’s (1931) recommendation, that em-
phasis should be given not to the safe or unsafe acts themselves, but to the
underlying skills they represent, i.e., diagnosis and decision making. General-
ization of this recommendation is offered by cognitive game theory (Erev,
1998; Erev & Roth, in press), which implies that understanding choice behavior
is a prerequisite when planning a training program. For this, three factors
have to be modeled. First, one has to consider the structural characteristics of
the task, such as the incentive structure and the available information. The
second is the set of strategies considered by the decision maker. Analysis of
the interaction between these two factors will reflect the underlying skills
needed for optimal performance. Finally, the effects of different kinds of feed-
back on the learning process must be comprehended to come up with effective
training procedures.140 BARKAN, ZOHAR, AND EREV
The present research suggests that in many industrial safety problems, the
first two factors can be approximated by a probabilistic SDT model (the current
quantification of Heinrich’s observation). In addition, the current experimental
results suggest that the third factor can be approximated by the CRL model.
The relative success of the CRL model suggests that it might be used for
deriving predictions for other safety problems modeled as probabilistic signal
detection tasks. For example, the CRL model can be utilized to predict the
effect of the extremely low probability of penalty (i.e., about 1/300) which
apparently characterizes industrial accidents (Heinrich, 1931), but cannot be
efficiently studied experimentally. Basically, the model predicts that the trends
observed here will intensify as probability decreases and that initial learning
toward suboptimal risky behavior will take longer. More research in this direc-
tion should examine these possibilities.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Safety problems are being studied from different points of view, aiming at
different questions, and using different models and experimental procedures.
Obviously, there is no one “best” or “only” way to approach the problems of
risk taking in these situations. We suggest that the present work complements
the existing research in three ways.
The vast body of the safety research focuses around the themes of causation
and intervention. Much of the work regarding causation is very theory oriented
(e.g., Petersen, 1988; Reason, 1995). On the other hand the work regarding
intervention is more field oriented (e.g., McAfee & Winn, 1989). The present
work complements the existing research by utilizing a controlled experiment
procedure as a middle stage between theory and field research. In doing so,
we were able to investigate the cognitive mechanisms that may both reflect
theoretical constructs as well as govern day-to-day behavior in the field. One
could argue against the synthetic experimental task we have employed and
the lack of its external validity. This shortcoming cannot be ignored, yet our
findings are consistent with both theoretical claims and field findings. In the
face of this consistency we suggest that it may be safe enough to consider the
experimental task as a useful simulation of the decision problem in safety
situations. Moreover, this consistency may point out the importance of “ordi-
nary” cognitive processes that underlie behavior in risky situations.
Utilizing signal detection offers two additional advantages for safety re-
search.First,as McKenna(1988)pointedout,qualitative definitionsofcommon
concepts such as “uncertainty” “risk,” and “human error” are frequently vague
and tend to carry on different meanings in different works. The probabilistic
SDT model we have suggested here allows clear quantitative definitions for
these concepts as well as a specific criterion and quantitative measures of risk
taking. Second, the proposed model has also made us able to demonstrate some
common assumptions about factors that enhance risk taking, such as the rarity
of actual accidents and the imperfect feedback for safe and risky acts. ThoughACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 141
these assumptions are widely used in safety research, to the best of our knowl-
edge they have not been tested.
APPENDIX A
The Hill-Climbing Model Learning Rule
Hill-climbing is guided by the change in (average) payoffs, produced by a
change in the cutoff from two prior applications of the rule. If the previous
change in the cutoff produced an increase in average payoffs (an uphill direc-
tion), then the next change is made in the same direction. However, if the
previouschangeinthecutoffproducedadecreaseinaveragepayoffs(adownhill
direction), then the next change is in the opposite direction.
Define u1 and u2 as the cutoff values that were used on the last and second-
to-last steps, respectively. Define v1 and v2 as the average values of payoffs
produced on the last and second-to-last steps, respectively.
The product of the differences h is called the hill-climbing adjustment:
h 5 (n1 2 n2)*( u1 2 u2).
The next cutoff u is determined to be
u 5 u1 1 l *m(h) 1 (1 2 l)*e,
where m(h) is a monotone increasing function of the hill-climbing adjustment
h; e is a randomly chosen direction; and l is a weight (0 , l , 1) that moderates
the amount of random search. Busemeyer and Myung (1992) used a simple
example in which m(h) was set as a step function: m(h) 5 c if h . 0, m(h) 5
2c if h , 0, m(h) 5 random choice of c or 2c if h 5 0, and the effect of the
random search was eliminated by setting l 5 1.
According to this simple example the next cutoff u is determined to be
u 5 u1 1 c if h . 0; u 5 u1 2 c if h , 0; u 5 (u1 1 c)o r( u1 2 c)i fh 5 0.
The HC model was operationalized in this work using the same parameters
of this simple example.
APPENDIX B
The Cutoff Reinforcement Learning Rule
Erev et al.’s (1995) adaptation of Roth and Erev’s (1995) learning rule can
be summarized by the following four assumptions:
A finite number of uniformly and symmetrically distributed cutoffs.
A1q. The DM considers a finite set of m cutoffs. The location of cutoff j
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cj 5 cmin 1 D(j 2 1).
Erev et al. defined D 5 2(cmax)/( m 2 1) and set the two strategy-set parameters
to m 5 101 and cmax 5 5 (note that the symmetry assumption implies that cmin
52 cmax).
Initial propensities.
A2q. At time t 5 1 (before any experience) the DM has an initial propen-
sity to choose the jth cutoff.
Two initial propensities parameters were set, S(1) and si. To set these param-
eters Erev et al. defined qk(l) 5 pk(1)S(l) where S(1) 5o
m
j51
qj(t) and pk(1) is the
probability that cutoff k will be chosen in the first round. They assumed that
S(1) 5 3* (the average absolute profit in the game, given randomly selected
cutoffs) and determined pk(1) by the area (above cutoff k) under a normal
distribution with a mean at the center of the two distributions and standard
deviation si 5 1.5.
Reinforcement, generalization, and forgetting. The learning process is the
result of the updating of the propensities through reinforcement, generaliza-
tion, and forgetting.
A3q. If cutoff k was chosen by the DM at time t and the received payoff
was v then the propensity to set cutoff j is updated by setting
qj (t 1 1) 5 max[n,(1 2 w)qj(t) 1 Gk(j, Rt,( v(t)))],
where n is a technical parameter that ensures that all propensities are positive,
w is a forgetting parameter Gk(.,.) is a generalization function and R(.) is a
reinforcement function.
Erev et al. set n 5 .0001, w 5 .001. The reinforcement function was set to
Rt (v(t)) 5 v(t) 2 r(t), where r is a reference point that is determined by the
following contingent weighted average adjustment rule
r(t)(1 2 w+) 1 v(t)(w+)i fv(t) $ r(t)
r(t 1 1) 5
r(t)(1 2 w2) 1 v(t)(w2)i fv(t) , r(t),
where w+ 5 .01 and w2 5 .02 are the weights by which positive and negative
reinforcements affect the reference point.
The generalization function was set to:
Gk(j, R(v)) 5 R(v)(F{[cj 1 cj11]/2} 2 F{[cj 1 cj21]/2}),
where F {.} is a cumulative normal distribution with mean ck and standard
deviation sg. Erev et al. set sg 5.25.ACCIDENTS AND DECISION MAKING 143
The Relative Propensities Sum. The final assumption states the choice rule.
A4q. The probability that the observer sets strategy k at time t is deter-
mined by the relative propensities sum:
Pk(t) 5 qk (t)/Fo
m
j51
qj (t)G.
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